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No. 20070802 - CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JASON CODY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
WILLARD LOWE And Renee Hancock, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
APPELLEE WILLARD LOWE'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this 
case. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Lexis 2006). On October 3, 2007, the 
Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Lexis 2006). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. This Court Should Decline to Address the Appeal as the Brief 
Does Not Comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
Does Not State a Legal Basis for Review, 
Appellant's Brief lacks any legal argument and provides no citation to 
applicable case law supporting the claim of denial of due process of law by the 
District Court or the respective clerks and presiding judges. As such, Cody has 
provided no legal basis for overturning the District Court ruling. 
7. Standard of Review 
This question does not involve review of the trial court's order and 
therefore no standard of review applies. 
II. Plaintiff's Due Process argument was not raised in the court 
below and as such should not be addressed for the first time on 
appeal. 
Defendant's contention that he has been denied due process of law in 
violation of the "Fo[u]rth Amendment the Fifth Amendment, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America" is raised for the 
first time in this appeal and should not be addressed here. 
J. Standard of Review 
This queslion does not involve review of the trial court's order and 
therefore no standard of review applies. 
2 
2. Preservation of the Issue 
Cody failed to raise the constitutional issues before the trial court and has 
not properly preserved them. Luke v. Redko Int'l, N. V., 2005 UT App 517 (citing 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (UT App. 1997)). 
III. Cody was not denied Due Process when the District Court 
Reviewed the Pleadings and Made a Ruling Based on Those 
Pleadings 
A. Consideration of the Motion to Dismiss Does not violate the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure or deny Plaintiff Due Process of Law, 
Trial courts have broad discretion to determine how a case will proceed. 
Branden Miles, acting pro bono in this matter, filed a Motion to Dismiss with the 
District Court on July 5, 2007. The Motion was filed prior to any hearings, motions 
to submit, requests for default, or setting of trial dates pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 12(h). Did the District Court fail to comply with the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure when they reviewed all pleadings on the record? 
1. Standard of Review 
Appellate courts review the trial court's interpretation of rules for 
correctness. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995) ("The standard of 
review for a simple legal interpretation of a rule...is correctness"); Utah Dept. of 
Environment. Quality v. Redd, 2002 UT 50,11 12 ("where this review requires us to 
examine statutory language, we look first to the plain meaning of the statute"). 
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2. Preservation of the Issue 
Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock filed the Motion to Dismiss, and Cody 
opposed the motion. R at 032 - 050 and R at 097 -108. The court entered an 
order granting the Defendant's Motion on August 23, 2007. R at 120 -122. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated §78-7-5(3) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b), (c), and (h). 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pro se Appellant Jason Cody appeals the trial court's final order that 
granted dismissal to Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock. Cody sued Lowe 
and Hancock to recover damages he claims were caused by Hancock 
and Lowe's testimony in a criminal case in which Cody was the 
Defendant. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Cody claims that the District Court violated his rights when they 
dismissed the civil action against Lowe and Hancock. The original action 
arises as a result of Lowe's and Hancock's testimony against Cody in a 
criminal trial in which Cody was convicted of assaulting Lowe and 
Hancock in a dispute over the location of a potted plant. 
Cody filed his first complaint against Lowe and Hancock, alleging 
harassment, malicious mischief, obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting 
false claims, conspiracy to commit perjury and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, on May 17, 2007. R. at 001. His amended complaint, 
adding an allegation of Malicious prosecution was filed on June 4, 2007. 
R. at 010-013. Lowe and Hancock received notice of this action on June 
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11, 2007. R. a\ 025-026. Lowe and Hancock, being elderly and on fixed 
incomes, were unable to afford an attorney and unfamiliar with the legal 
process so they contacted attorney Branden Miles for advice. Mr. Miles 
received permission from his employer to assist Lowe and Hancock as a 
pro bono attorney. 
Through Mr. Miles, Lowe and Hancock filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim on July 5, 2007. R. at 032-050. Cody filed an 
"Order to Enter Judgment by Default in Favor of the Plaintiff" on July 5, 
2007, the same day that the Motion to Dismiss was received by the District 
Court. R. at 029. 
Cody's Motion to Enter Default Judgment was filed fifteen days later 
on July 20, 2007. R. at 060. On that same day, Cody also asked the District 
Court for leave to amend his complaint a second time. R. 076-083. 
On July 23, Cody filed an opposition to Lowe and Hancock's Motion 
to Dismiss. R. at 097. Lowe and Hancock moved to consolidate the cases 
on July 26, 2007 and Cody opposed consolidation on August 13, 2007. R. 
at 109, R. at 117. 
6 
On August 23, 2007, after reviewing the pleadings, the Honorable 
Judge Ernie Jones granted the Motion to Dismiss. R. at 120-122. Cody filed 
a notice of appeal on September 21, 2007. R. at 125. 
Statement of Facts 
On May 18, 2006, the Appellant, Jason Cody, brutally assaulted 
Appellees Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock in front of their home. R. at 
032 (Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, p. 1). A neighbor 
intervened and police were called to the scene. R. at 033 [Id. at 2). Mr. 
Lowe and Ms. Hancock were transported to the hospital and Cody was 
taken to the Weber County Jail. R. at 033 (/d.) Mr. Lowe had sustained 
multiple wounds to his head and Ms. Hancock was treated for a broken 
bone and a partially severed pinky, the results of being bitten by Cody. R. 
at 033 (Id.) 
Cody was tried and convicted of Aggravated Assault, a third-
degree felony; Assault with Substantial Bodily Injury, a class A 
misdemeanor; and Criminal Mischief, a class A misdemeanor as a result of 
the incident.1 R. at 034 [Id. at 3.). Both Lowe and Hancock, as the victims 
1
 The case number for the Criminal charges is 061902461. 
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of the assaults, testified during the criminal trial as to the incident and the 
injuries they sustained. 
Cody filed this suit in response to the incidents outlined above. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court in all respects. Cody raises only 
one issue on appeal and has not provided any information which requires 
or supports the reversal of the trial court. 
First, the Appellant's Brief fails to meet even the basic requirements 
outlined in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or the "pro se guide" 
provided to Cody by the Supreme Court of Utah on October 3, 2007. At 
a minimum, the brief should include an argument section supported by 
citations to the law and appropriate precedent. Cody has not provided 
any such argument for the Appellee to respond to or for the Court to base 
a decision on. Therefore, the Court should decline to address the issue 
presented. 
Second, Cody did not raise any claim that the denial of his Motion 
for Entry of Default violated his federal constitutional rights before the trial 
court. He is therefore barred from asserting them for the first time on 
appeal. 
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Finally, the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss, even 
though it was filed outside of the time prescribed for an answer. Cody's 
Complaint was frivolous and failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. His Motion for Entry of Default, filed fifteen days after 
the Motion to Dismiss, was insufficient to support a default judgment given 
the pleadings before the trial court. Default judgments must be requested 
by the Plaintiff and are granted only if the trial court determines that the 
judgment is warranted. The three day delay in the filing of the Motion to 
Dismiss is, at best, harmless error. Even if the default judgment had been 
entered prior to Lowe and Hancock's Motion to Dismiss, the judge has the 
discretion to set aside the judgment for good cause and such would have 
been the case here. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Should Decline to Address the Appeal as the Brief 
Does Not Comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
Does Not State a Legal Basis for Review. 
The procedure for filing an appeal, including the minimum 
requirements of an Appellant Brief, is provided for in the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 24. Notably lacking in the 
Appellant's Brief is an argument section. "The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented...with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on.1' Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). Although 
Cody makes numerous contentions in his "Summary of Argument" and 
"Conclusion" the brief lacks an "Argument" section and is conspicuously 
devoid of any citation to authorities and statutes. Failure to properly brief 
an issue is sufficient grounds for this Court to assume the correctness of the 
trial court's decision and affirm the trial court. See e.g., Carrier v. Salt Lake 
County, 2004 UT 98,11 43 ("it is well established that a reviewing court will 
not address arguments that are not adequately briefed"); State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (UT 1989) (declining to address issue when 
"brief wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support" argument); 
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Selvage v. J J. Johnson and Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1264 (UT App. 1996) 
(declining to address issue where party "cites no authority" or "any further 
analysis" in support of argument). 
Cody has not provided this Court with any legal framework upon 
which to base a review and as such, this Court should decline to address 
the issue. 
II. Appellant's Due Process Argument was Not Raised in the Court 
Below and Should Not be Addressed for the First Time on 
Appeal. 
As a general rule, issues raised for the first time on appeal are not 
addressed by the reviewing court. Carrier, 2004 UT 98 U 43. The exception 
to this rule is found where the appellant "can demonstrate exceptional 
circumstances" as to why the issue was not raised at the trial level.2 Pugh 
v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, H 18. Cody failed to raise the Federal 
Constitutional question before the trial court and is raising it here for the 
first time. Cody has provided no support for his claim that he was denied 
due process in order to meet the high standard for a showing of 
exceptional circumstances. Id. 
2
 A second exception has been carved out in cases where Appellant can show the 
trial court committed "plain error." State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, ^  39. This exception will 
be addressed in Section III in addressing the actions taken by the District Court. 
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The Appellant Brief is sadly lacking in any legal argument, but it is 
clear that Cody bases his claim on the so called "failure...to comply with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." [Appellant's Brief, p. 3]. Failure to 
comply with a state or local regulation alone will not give rise to Federal 
Constitutional protections. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
This issue has not been briefed and the bald accusations of 
Appellant at this late date do not provide a legal basis for review of the 
District Court's decision. 
III. Cody was not Denied Due Process when the District Court 
Reviewed the Pleadings and Made a Ruling Based on those 
Pleadings. 
A. Consideration of the Motion to Dismiss does not Violate the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.3 
Trial judges are granted broad discretion in determining the process 
of litigation in their court. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 
702 (UT App. 1994); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3) (Lexis 2006) (Court 
3
 It is important to note here that Appellant has waived the right to argue the merits 
of the Motion to Dismiss. His only argument, both here and at the trial level, consists of 
his misunderstanding as to the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure and entry of 
Default Judgment. Although the Dismissal was unquestionably warranted, by not raising 
the question, Appellant has waived any issue on the merits of the Dismissal itself. 
12 
has authority to "provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it 
or its officers"). In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by Lowe and Hancock. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a party may move for 
judgment on the pleadings, or Motion to Dismiss, at any time that will not 
"delay the trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c). Although the Motion to Dismiss was 
received three days beyond the twenty days prescribed for filing an 
answer, Appellant was not prejudiced by this delay. The Motion to Dismiss 
was filed with the trial court and a copy sent to Appellant prior to a Notice 
of Default or even a Motion requesting that the trial court enter a default. 
R. at 032-050 and R. at 060-064 (Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Enter 
Judgment by Default, respectively). 
Cody makes several claims based on the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The sum and substance is that the Second District Court Clerk 
and Judge Ernie Jones attempted to "circumvent the law to suit their own 
personal preference" in denying him the default judgment that he was 
entitled to. [Appellant's Brief, p. 4]. Default Judgment can be entered in 
one of two ways: 1) by the clerk upon motion by the Plaintiff; or 2) upon 
application to the Court. Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b). 
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Before a clerk can enter a default judgment, four factors must be 
met. Of particular concern for this case is the fourth factor, requiring that 
the judgment be for a "certain sum or for a sum that can be made certain 
by computation." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)(C) and (D). The Amended 
Complaint called for an "award of actual damages" in the amount of 
$50,000, plus punitive damages and fees. R. at 010-013 (Amended CompI. 
p. 4). Neither the Complaint, nor the Amended Complaint offered proof 
of damages sufficient to allow entry of judgment by the Clerk. See, e.g. 
Skanchy v. Calcados Off ope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (UT 1998) ("if the 
damages claimed are unliquidated, a default judgment can be entered 
only by a judge). Therefore, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Court Clerk was precluded from entering default judgment in this case. 
Before a judge can enter a default where the claim involves 
unliquidated damages, an application must be made to the court 
requesting the entry of default. Utah R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2) (Lexis 2006). 
Cody's application for entry of default was filed with the Court on July 20, 
2007, fifteen days after the Motion to Dismiss was filed and taken under 
consideration by the Judge. R. at 060. (Motion to Enter Judgment by 
Default in Favor of Plaintiff). In order to enter judgment on this Complaint, 
14 
Judge Jones was required to "review the complaint, determine whether 
the allegations state a valid claim for relief, and award damages in an 
amount that is supported by some valid evidence." Calcados Ortope SA, 
952 P.2d at 1076. "The allegations in [this] complaint are not a sufficient 
basis for awarding damages." Id. See also, Russell v. Martell, 618 P.2d 
1193, 1195-96 (Utah 1984) (reversing default judgment where sums were 
not certain and no hearing was held). 
Default judgment is not guaranteed simply because a defendant 
fails to appear. Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 
(Utah 1962). The Rules of Civil Procedure allow for entry of default "only if 
the well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 
1998). In order to decide if there was some valid evidence to support the 
claim, and to justify setting a hearing date to determine damages, Judge 
Jones reviewed the Complaint, as well as Cody's Opposition to the Motion 
to Dismiss and drew "all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Cody." R. at 
120. (Ruling Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Claim, p. 1). As discussed in the Ruling, after giving Cody the benefit of 
the doubt, Judge Jones found that "[e]ach of the Plaintiff's causes of 
15 
action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Plaintiff 
has either failed to support each claim with adequate factual support, or 
has failed to state a cognizable cause of action in compliance with the 
well-pleaded complaint rule." R. at 121 [Id. at p.2). 
The trial court, pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered 
the evidence before it in determining whether a default judgment was 
warranted and what amount should be awarded. Even liberally 
construed, the heart of Cody's argument is that the court erred in not 
granting his motion for default judgment. As shown above, this argument 
has no foundation in law or in fact. The trial court acted properly and the 
ruling should be affirmed. 
B. Default Judgments are not favored in the law, and can be Set Aside 
for Good Cause. 
It is well-settled that default judgments are not favored in the law. 
Heafhman, 377 P.2d at 190 (Utah 1962); see also, Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 
UT 81, H 63 ("judgment by default is an extreme measure and a case 
should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits"). When a default 
judgment is entered in a case, the trial court has been given broad 
16 
discretion in setting aside those judgments and "should be generally 
indulgent toward vacating default judgments." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 
UT 81, H 63 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Cody claims that 
the Rules of Civil Procedure require the judge to enter a default judgment 
because the Answer was filed three days late. [Appellant's Brief, p.5]. 
While this claim is clearly erroneous, even if a default had been entered, 
Lowe and Hancock would have been entitled to have the judgment set 
aside. Once set aside, the trial court would have considered the Motion 
to Dismiss; therefore, at most, the trial court's refusal of the motion to enter 
default was harmless error. As such, Cody has failed to establish sufficient 
grounds for reversal of the dismissal and the trial court ruling must be 
upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court. Lowe and Hancock 
established that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure supported dismissal in 
the lower court and that Cody did not properly preserve a due process 
claim in the lower court. Because the only issue raised in this appeal is the 
alleged violation of his due process rights, which were not properly 
preserved, this Court should refuse to consider the appeal. Further, as 
17 
shown above, the trial court properly followed the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in considering the evidence and ruling on the pleadings. 
Therefore, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this | X day of 7\(AA/ . 2008. 
. JrfnsUn / 1 /M/ ( 
BRANDEN B. MILES 
Attorney for Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ' day of , j (AfU. 2008,1 caused 
to be served, by U.S. Mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing, 
APPELLEE WILLARD LOWE AND RENEE HANCOCK BRIEF, to the following: 
Jason Cody 
P.O. Box 9732 
Ogden, UT 84409 
j){^/)A^ /A A^YJ 
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Addendum 
A 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNT^ 0 5 £QQJ 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH A TjQP kipw 
JASON CODY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLARD LOWE and 
RENEE HANCOCK, 
Defendants. 
RULING GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM 
Civil No. 070902903 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
The Defendants, Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock, have moved to dismiss Mr. 
Cody's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mr. 
Cody has opposed the motion. Having considered the parties' memoranda, the Court 
grants the motion for the reasons stated in the Defendants' memorandum. 
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) "admits the facts alleged in the 
complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." St. Benedict's 
Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp.} 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). In reviewing the 
complaint, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Cody. 
On May 18, 2006, the Plaintiff, Jason Brad Cody, brutally assaulted the 
Defendants. On February 15, 2007, the Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated assault, 
assault with substantial bodily injury, and criminal mischief arising from his assault on the 
Ruling Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
No. 070902903 
Defendants. On May 17, 2007, the Plaintiff filed this complaint against his victims, 
stating seven causes of action. 
Each of the Plaintiffs causes of action fails to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. The Plaintiff has either failed to support each claim with adequate factual 
support, or has failed to state a cognizable cause of action in compliance with the well-
pleaded complaint rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Additionally, the Plaintiff fails to 
support claims of fraud or other forms of deception with particularity according to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
The Court, therefore, grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court 
dismisses the complaint with prejudice. Mr. Miles will please prepare the appropriate 
order. 
Dated this,? 3 day of August, 2007. 
2 
Ruling Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
No. 070902903 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Z^day of August, 2007,1 sent a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ruling as follows: 
Branden B. Miles 
Counsel for Defendants 
2380 Washington Blvd. 2nd Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Jason B. Cody 
P.O. Box 9732 
Ogden, UT 84409-1182 
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Addendum 
B 
BRANDEN B. MILES, UBN 9777 f l l fc C O P Y 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD. 2ND FLOOR S l l a* 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
) 
JASON CODY ) 
) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
Plaintiff ) STATE A CLAIM 
) 
v. ) Case No. 070902903 MI (Lowe) 
) Case No. 070902904 MI (Hancock) 
WILLARD LOWE ) 
RENEE HANCOCK ) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
) Judge Ernie W. Jones 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants move the court for 
an order dismissing claims one through seven in the plaintiffs complaint. The grounds for this motion are 
that each claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff has either failed to 
support each claim with adequate factual support, or the plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable cause 
of action in compliance with the well-pleaded complaint rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Additionally, the plaintiff fails to support claims of fraud or other forms of deception with particularity 
according to Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is supported by the 
memorandum in support filed with this motion and all other pleadings on file with the court in this action. 
FACTS 
On May 18, 2006, the plaintiff, Jason Brad Cody, brutally assaulted Willard Lowe and Renee 
Hancock in front of their home. During a dispute over the location of a potted tree, the plaintiff 
punched Willard Lowe, a 74-year-old man who weighed about 125 pounds, in the stomach causing 
him to fall to the ground. Mr. Lowe had not hit the Defendant nor threatened to do so prior to his being 
struck. Once Mr Lowe fell to the ground, the Defendant, who was fifty-six and weighed more than 
200 pounds, jumped on top of Mr. Lowe and pinned his arms underneath him. From this position, the 
Defendant repeatedly punched, slapped, and slammed Mr. Lowe's head onto the asphalt of the 
roadway. 
Mr. Lowe struggled to get out from under the Plaintiff, but was unable to because of his size. 
Renee Hancock is 69 years old. She observed the Plaintiff punching Mr. Lowe repeatedly and she ran 
out to help Mr. Lowe. Ms. Hancock attempted to pull the Plaintiff off of Mr. Lowe, but the Plaintiff 
seized her hand and bit down on it, breaking a bone and severing a tendon in her finger. 
Shortly after the Plaintiff bit through Ms. Lowe's hand, a neighbor pulled the Plaintiff off Mr. 
Lowe and separated the parties. Multiple people then called the police. The police and medical 
personnel arrived to treat Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock. Both were transported to the hospital. Mr. 
Lowe sustained multiple abrasions to his head, his eye was severely swollen, and he was bleeding 
profusely from various cuts in his head. Ms. Hancock was treated for her broken bone and had a 
tendon partially severed in her pinky. She has undergone physical therapy but continues to have 
problems with numbness and her ability to hold things with that hand. 
The Plaintiff complained of breathing difficulty, but ultimately it was determined that he was fine 
and he was transported to the Weber County Jail. He was charged with Aggravated Assault, a third 
degree felony; Assault with Substantial Bodily Injury, a class A misdemeanor; and Criminal Mischief, a 
class A misdemeanor. Information on the criminal case can be found under case number 061902461. 
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On February 15, 2007, after the evidence was heard during a non-jury trial, the Plaintiff was found 
guilty beyond all reasonable doubt for these offenses. On April 2, the Plaintiff was sentenced to a 
suspended prison sentence with formal probation and 180 days in the Weber County Jail. He is 
currently still and inmate at the jail where he has now commenced this frivolous lawsuit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE HE FAILS TO 
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
According to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim may be dismissed 
when the plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." URCP 12(b)(6). A well-
plead complaint sets forth "(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is 
entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." 
URCP 8(a). Additionally, claims that allege fraud or any sort of misrepresentations, omissions, or other 
forms of deception must be stated with particularity. URCP 9(b). Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). 
A plaintiff must assert facts to support the conclusion that he has been, somehow, wronged. In 
Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, a plaintiff submitted a three-paragraph complaint which alleged that 
the defendants conspired together to annoy, threaten, and intimidate the plaintiff until the plaintiff had to 
discontinue his business and, as a result, suffered damages. Utah Steel & Iron Co. V. Bosch, 475 
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court denied. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, reasoning that a mere allegation that the defendants conspired to annoy, threaten, and 
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intimidate the plaintiff is insufficient when it does not state the nature or substance of the acts alleged 
committed by the defendants. Id. The court further reasoned that a well-plead complaint should "give 
the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of 
the type of litigation involved." Id. Citing Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P 2d 453 (Utah 1955). 
Even pro se plaintiffs who have no legal training or experience must assert a certain amount of 
specificity in their complaints, especially when involving allegations of fraud or deception. In Heathman 
v. Hatch, a layperson sued his attorney, supporting his claim with a 33-page complaint which alleged 
the defendant was guilty of fraud, conspiracy, and negligence. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 
(Utah 1962). Though a few specific facts were asserted, the court found that the terms "fraud, 
conspiracy, and negligence" were conclusory accusations, for they only asserted legal conclusions 
rather than giving any specific facts to support those conclusions. Id. The court reasoned that the 
objective of Rule 8(a) is to require "that the essential facts upon which redress is sought be set forth 
with simplicity, brevity, clarity, and certainty so that it can be determined whether there exists a legal 
basis for the relief claimed." Id. Similarly, in a case which arose out of Heathman v. Hatch, the court 
reasoned that a complaint alleging false affidavits and false pleadings should provide the "contents, 
nature, or substance of the alleged false statements]." Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 
189 (Utah 1962). The court found that, given the general accusations contained in the complaint, "it 
[was] clear beyond question that no claim was stated upon which relief could be granted." Id. 
I Specifically, the court found this claim insufficient because it gave no notice to the defendants about the nature or 
substance of the acts complained of nor was there any mention of causation between the defendants' actions and 
the alleged effect on the plaintiff Utah Steel & iron Co. V Bosch, 475 P 2d 1019 (Utah 1970). 
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A, Malicious Prosecution 
In order to successfully maintain a claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must establish 
four elements: (1) that the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, (2) the criminal 
proceeding was initiated without probable cause, (3) the criminal proceeding was for purposes of 
malice rather than bringing an offender to justice, and (4) the criminal proceedings terminated in the 
accused's (the plaintiffs) favor. Failure to establish any one of the four elements is fatal to the plaintiffs 
cause of action. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 at 959. Gilbert v. Paul R. Inc & 
Callister, 981 P. 2d 841 (Utah 1999), Specifically, malicious prosecution only occurs when the 
defendant2 initiates criminal proceedings against an innocent plaintiff8. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). (That plaintiff was prosecuted and found guilty is an absolute affirmative 
defense.) 
On February 15, 2007, the plaintiff in this case, Jason Cody, was convicted of aggravated 
assault (a 3rd degree felony), assault with substantial bodily injury (a class A misdemeanor), and criminal 
mischief (a class A misdemeanor) for causing bodily injury to both defendants, Willard Lowe and 
Renee Hancock, which occurred on May 18,2006. The plaintiff was sentenced to 180 days in jail. 
Because the plaintiff here was successfully prosecuted and found guilty beyond any reasonable doubt, 
the Court should grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim.4 
1 Defendant in the civil suit, victim or witness in the prior criminal action. 
2 Plaintiff in the civil suit, defendant in the prior criminal action. 
3 It should also be noted that though the plaintiff alleges an 8th cause of action against the defendants for malicious 
prosecution, he fails to support this claim with any facts. Therefore, should the court decide to not give summary 
judgment, the plaintiffs claim for malicious prosecution should at least be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted as he has asserted no facts to support his claim. URCP 12(b)(6). URCP 8(a). 
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B. Claims Based on Allegations of Deception 
Claims that allege fraud or any sort of misrepresentations, omissions, or other forms of 
deception must be stated with particularity so as to give the defendant notice of the "contents, nature, or 
substance of the alleged false statements[s]. URCP 9(b). Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 
966 (Utah 1982). (When a plaintiff complains of conduct (i described by such general terms as 
libel intimidate, or false statements, the allegation of the conclusion is not sufficient; the 
pleading must describe the nature or the substance of the acts or words complained of ) 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962). Mere allegations are insufficient 
when the nature and substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendant are not stated, and legal 
conclusions must be supported by facts. Utah Steel & Iron Co. V. Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
1970). Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 (Utah 1962). 
The first four claims addressed here are all similar in two ways. First, each claim asserts that the 
defendants have engaged in some sort of deception; therefore, the plaintiff is required to state a claim 
with particularity. Second, each claim fails to support the plaintiffs conclusory accusation of deception 
with any facts, particular or otherwise, regarding the nature or substance of the acts or statements 
complained of, thereby not giving any notice to the defendant about the contents, nature, or substance 
of the alleged false statements. 
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For his claims of obstruction of justice5, perjury6, conspiracy7, and submitting a false claim8, the 
plaintiff only asserts broad, conclusory allegations without providing any facts to show the contents, 
nature, and substance of the alleged acts committed or statements made by the defendants. The plaintiff 
even fails to provide a date or period of time when any of these alleged falsities occurred. For example, 
in his claim for obstruction of justice, the plaintiff only alleges that the defendants "provided false and 
erroneous information" to the police and courts which caused the plaintiff to be arrested, prosecuted, 
and ultimately convicted.9 Additionally, in his claim for perjury, the plaintiff only alleges that the 
defendants gave false information in affidavits and that the defendants gave false testimony in court.10 
2 The plaintiffs claims for obstruction of justice are stated as follows: (1) "Defendant has provided false erroneous 
information and statements to the police in attempts to cause problems for the Plaintiff and causing the Plaintiff to be 
arrested and jailed by the city police" and (2) "Defendant has provided false and erroneous information to the courts 
causing them to take actions against Plaintiff." These claims are brought against both defendants. 
3 The plaintiffs claims for perjury are stated as follows: (1) "Defendant has sworn to false information in affidavits" 
and (2) "Defendant has given false testimony to the courts on several occasions concerning the Plaintiff." These 
claims are brought against both defendants. 
4 The plaintiffs claim for conspiracy to commit perjury and obstruction of justice is stated as follows: "Defendant 
has conspired with other persons to submit false information to police and false testimony to the courts." This claim 
is brought against both defendants. 
5The plaintiffs claim for submitting a false claim is stated as follows: "Defendant has submitted false erroneous 
claims to the court with regard to medical expenses and restitution." This claim is brought against both defendants. 
6 Additionally, as codified in the Utah Criminal Code, obstruction of justice occurs only when the person accused of 
obstruction intends to "hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or 
punishment of any person." Utah Code Ann. 76-8-306. Here, the defendants provided information to police, 
prosecutors, and the court with the intent to do just the opposite-the defendants wanted the plaintiff investigated, 
apprehended, prosecuted, convicted, and punished. The plaintiff even supports this view by alleging in his 
complaint that the information provided by the defendants caused the plaintiff to be arrested, jailed, prosecuted, and 
convicted. Therefore, because the defendants did not obstruct justice but, instead, initiated it, the plaintiff has no 
claim against the defendants for obstruction of justice. Further, obstruction of justice is an offense against the state, 
so it is questionable whether the plaintiff even has a legitimate cause of action for such an offense. 
7 Further, according to section 76-8-505 of the Utah Criminal Code, a person may not be found guilty of falsification 
in official matters when the only proof of falsification is a mere contradiction between the accused and another 
witness. Utah Code Ann. 76-8-505(1) Here, the plaintiffs complaint only provides the implied assertion that he 
believes the defendants' statement were false. Such evidence alone is not enough to prove perjury. Additionally, 
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Similarly, in his claim for submitting a false claim, the plaintiff only alleges that the defendants submitted 
false claims to the court regarding medical expenses, though the plaintiff does not allege any facts about 
the nature or cause of these medical expenses or even why the defendants' medical expenses have 
anything to do with the plaintiff. Finally, Plaintiffs claims only allege criminal offenses which are 
prosecuted by the government. He has not identified a legally-cognizable, private cause of action. 
Because the plaintiff only asserts broad, conclusory accusations that do not give the defendant notice of 
the content, nature, or substance of the alleged acts and statements complained of, the plaintiffs claim 
should be dismissed. 
Similar to the plaintiffs claims that the defendant has obstructed justice and perjured himself, 
the plaintiff also asserts the broad, conclusory allegation that the defendant has conspired with 
unidentified "other persons" to commit obstruction of justice and perjury. A plaintiff who asserts that the 
defendant is liable for civil conspiracy must prove all of the following five elements: (1) a combination of 
two or more persons, (2) with a common object to accomplish, (3) had a meeting of the minds about 
that object to be accomplished or the course of action to accomplish that object, (4) those persons 
participated in one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) caused damages to the plaintiff as a proximate 
result of their actions. Alta Indus v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993); Israel Pagan Estates v. 
Cannon, 746 P. 2d 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Civil conspiracy is recognized as common law in 
Utah and is similar to criminal conspiracy 76-4-201 of the Utah Code, requiring only the 
additional element of damages.). 
perjury is usually an offense against the state, so it is questionable whether the defendant even has a cognizable 
cause of action for perjury. 
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Here, similar to the other claims for perjury and obstruction of justice, the plaintiff fails to 
support his broad, conclusory allegations by providing any facts regarding the contents, nature, or 
substance of the acts and false statements alleged committed by the defendant. Additionally, the plaintiff 
only asserts the legal conclusion that the defendants are liable for conspiracy without supporting that 
conclusion with any facts. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not specify who the other conspirators were, 
the conspirators' common objective, or any meeting of the mind among the unknown conspirators. 
In conclusion, because the plaintiff has only asserted broad, conclusory allegations without 
giving any facts to show the contents, nature, and substance of the alleged acts committed and 
statements made by the defendant and because the plaintiff has, instead, only asserted legal conclusions 
which are also not supported by any facts, the plaintiffs claims for civil conspiracy, perjury, 
obstruction of justice, and submitting a false claim should all be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. 
C. General Claims 
A well-plead complaint should "give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis and 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Utah Steel & Iron Co. 
V. Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970). Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453 (Utah 1955). Mere 
accusations are not enough if the nature or substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendant 
are not stated. Utah Steel & Iron Co. V. Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970). Furthermore, legal 
conclusions and accusations must be supported by facts. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 (Utah 
1962). Essentially, a plaintiff must supply the defendant and the court with enough information to know 
both the legal cause of action the claim is brought under and the basic facts which support that the 
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plaintiff has a claim. Here, in each claim, the plaintiff fails to do one, the other, or both. The remaining 
claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because either 
(1) the claims are not supported by sufficient facts and are, instead, conclusory accusations; or (2) the 
claims do not state a cognizable cause of action for which there is a remedy at law. 
1. Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is only actionable if (1) the defendant's conduct is 
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality; (2) the defendant intends to cause or acts in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing 
emotional distress, (3) the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress; and (4) the defendant's conduct 
proximately causes the plaintiffs emotional distress. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 
2004). Bennett v. Jones, 70 P. 3d 17 (Utah 2003). 
Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are highly subjective and volatile in nature: 
they are easily fabricated, easy to assert, and hard to defend against. For those reasons, Utah courts 
have strictly limited recovery under emotional distress claims. Bennett v. Jones, 70 P. 3d 17. For a 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to survive, the conduct claimed to be distressing "must 
evoke outrage or revulsion, it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair." Id. "Conduct is not 
outrageous merely because it is tortuous, injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to 
punitive damages or because it is illegal.. . and clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, 
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."Id. For example, derogatory statements do 
not give rise to a claim of emotional distress. Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., 122 P.3d 891 
(Utah Ct. App. 2005). Similarly, a mere claim of improper filing of a law suit or abusive litigation is 
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also not enough to show emotional distress. Amderson Dev. Co., v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 
2005). 
The conduct described in the plaintiffs complaint11 arose from nothing more than a dispute over 
a potted tree. A dispute between neighbors is not uncommon: it is definitely not outrageous or 
revolting, and little else is less trivial. The plaintiff has alleged no facts which connect the defendant's 
conduct to the plaintiffs loss of home or spouse, especially given that the plaintiffs own actions which 
resulted in his criminal conviction and 180-day jail sentence for assaulting the defendants could have 
been the proximate cause of those events. Additionally, the plaintiff has failed to state with any 
specificity the so-called "various diseases and disorders" from which he allegedly now suffers nor are 
any facts given from which it can even be inferred that those diseases and disorders are "severe." 
In conclusion, because the plaintiff has given inadequate factual support that he suffers from 
severe emotional distress, because the plaintiff has given inadequate factual support that the defendant 
caused such distress, and because the plaintiff has, in general, not supported his claim with adequate 
facts to show the nature and substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendants, the court 
should dismiss plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
2. Harassment 
The court should dismiss the plaintiffs claim against the defendant for harassment because there 
8 The plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleges the following: "Through the 
aforementioned actions of the Defendants], [they] have caused the Plaintiff to be evicted from his home of 34 years 
and the dissolution of his marriage and the subsequent loss of his home itself. Also causing Plaintiffs health 
problems and exacerbation of various diseases and disorders suffered by Plaintiff, thereby causing Plaintiff to suffer 
extreme emotional distress." This claim is brought against both defendants. 
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is no cognizable, civil cause of action for, simply, harassment.12 Instead, harassment is the result of 
certain actions, conditions, or behavior, and occasionally the law regulates that behavior and provides a 
remedy for the harassment. For example, trespass, assault, or private nuisance are types of behaviors 
that cause harassment and provide a plaintiff with a cognizable cause of action. 
a. Assault 
Assault is intentionally causing another person reasonable, imminent apprehension of harmful or 
offensive contact. Restatement (Second) of Torts, 21. Furthermore, a person is not liable for assault 
for mere words or gestures unless those words and gestures are coupled together with other acts or 
circumstances that make a person reasonably apprehensive of imminent harmful or offensive contact. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 31. 
Here, the plaintiff only alleges that the defendant made gestures at the plaintiff and called the 
plaintiff vulgar names.13 The plaintiff does not provide any facts to describe the alleged gestures or 
language or any surrounding circumstances. Mere name calling alone is not enough to show that the 
defendant is liable to the plaintiff for assault, and without any further facts or detail it is impossible to 
determine whether the plaintiff has a claim for assault. Thus, the plaintiffs claim for assault should be 
dismissed. 
9 Harassment is also considered a crime under the Utah Criminal Code when a person "with intent to frighten or 
harass another . . . communicates a written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-5-
106 Even if the criminal harassment statute were used as a model for a civil offense of harassment, the plaintiff has 
asserted no facts to support either that the defendant communicated a written or recorded threat or that the 
defendant threatened the plaintiff with a violent felony. 
10 The plaintiffs claim under a cause of action heading for harassment is stated as follows: "Defendant engaged in 
actions to harass plaintiff by making various gestures at Plaintiff and by calling Plaintiff vulgar names and using 
obscene language." This claim is only brought against defendant Willard Lowe. 
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b. Private Nuisance 
Under a claim of private nuisance, a plaintiff must show (1) an existence of injury to the 
plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his property and (2) an injury that is both substantial and unreasonable. 
Walker Drug Co., Inc. V La Sal Oil Co., 972 P 2d 1238 (Utah, 1998). "A substantial injury is a 
significant injury, a harm of importance, involving more than a slight inconvenience or petty annoyance.' 
Id (It is undisputed that the interference with the plaintiff's property must be significant.) 
Furthermore, "unsubstantiated fears . . . are not the kind of substantial and significant interference with a 
landowner's use and enjoyment of his property" which is contemplated under an action for private 
nuisance. Id. (Unsubstantiated fear of contamination on adjacent property is not a significant 
interference.) 
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants placed various objects in the roadway which 
obstructed the plaintiffs view and made it difficult for him to enter and exit his driveway.14 It is also 
important to clarify that the plaintiff is not alleging that the defendants blocked his driveway, preventing 
the plaintiff from exiting or entering his property; rather, the plaintiff is alleging that the defendants 
obstructed his view. The first object, the potted tree, is placed where it is in order to mark the boundary 
of the defendant's property-hardly an unreasonable action. As a potted tree, the trunk is thin, the tree 
has few leaves and branches, and the widest portion of this condition is the pot in which the tree is 
planted. As for the defendant's truck and camper, it is not uncommon for a larger vehicle to obstruct 
11 the plaintiffs claim, under a cause of action heading for harassment, are stated as follows: (1) "Defendant caused 
a potted tree to be placed in the roadway near to Plaintiffs driveway to make it difficult for Plaintiff to access and 
egress his driveway," and (2) "Defendant parked his pickup truck with large camper shell in the roadway at the end 
of Plaintiff s driveway making it dangerous for Plaintiff to exit his driveway due to the obstructed view. This was 
contrary to the Park's rules." These claims are brought against both defendants. 
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the view for another vehicle. The parked truck was also not a permanent condition which constantly 
obstructed the plaintiffs view as he entered and exited his driveway. Additionally, neither the tree nor 
the truck are "substantial" or "significant" injury or harms of importance nor are they unusual; rather, 
both are only petty annoyances that caused the plaintiff the slight inconvenience of having to be more 
observant as he exited his driveway. 
In conclusion, because the plaintiff has failed to assert any facts to show that he suffered from a 
significant harm to the use and enjoyment of his property, the plaintiffs claims should be dismissed. 
c. Trespass 
Civil trespass is an intentional wrongful entry or physical invasion onto another's land. Walker 
Drug Co., Inc. V. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998). Citing O 'Neil v. San Pedro, 114 P. 
129 (Utah 1911) Also citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, 158. (A person is "liable to another 
for trespass . . . if he intentionally enters land in the possession of the other. . . . ") Though under a 
cause of action of harassment, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant "trespassed onto [his] leased 
property after [being] told not to trespass."15 However, the plaintiff only asserts the legal conclusion 
that the defendants trespassed without giving any facts to support that broad, conclusory allegation. 
The plaintiff also fails to assert any damages which were caused by the defendant's trespass. 
Damages for trespass are, generally, the difference between the value of the property immediately 
before and immediately after the trespass or, alternatively, the cost of restoration or repair. Henderson 
v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). (Trespassers who drove over grass and 
12 The plaintiffs claim, under a cause of action heading for harassment, is stated as follows: "Defendant further 
harassed Plaintiff by repeatedly trespassing on Plaintiffs leased property after he had been told not to trespass." 
This claim is only brought against defendant Willard Lowe. 
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knocked over signs only liable to property owner for nominal damages of one dollar.) However, 
when no actual or substantial damages are shown, "the law will infer nominal damages for the 
unauthorized entry onto the real property of another. Id. Nominal damages are "a trivial sum such as 
one cent or one dollar [which is] awarded to the plaintiff whose legal right has been invaded but who 
has failed to prove any compensatory damages. Id. (Citing Gould v. Mountain States Te. & Tel. 
Co., 309 P.2d 802 (Utah 1982). (A considerable amount such as $100 for trespass is not 
(i
nominal" damages). 
In conclusion, because legal conclusions must be supported by facts so as to give the 
defendants notice of the nature and substance of the acts alleged committed, because the plaintiff fails to 
assert anything but a legal conclusion, and because the plaintiff fails to assert any damages, the plaintiffs 
claim for trespass should be dismissed. 
d. Remaining Charges 
The plaintiffs final two claims under a cause of action for harassment assert that the defendant 
took "unwelcome photographs" of the plaintiff, his wife, and their property and that the defendant made 
false accusations16 about the plaintiff to management of a mobile home community.17 These allegations 
alone are so vague that, without additional facts, it is impossible to determine what sort of cause of 
action the plaintiff is suing under and should, therefore, be dismissed. 
13 As the plaintiff is again alleging that the defendants made some sort of false statement, such a claim should also 
be pled with particularity according to the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
14 The plaintiffs claims under a cause of action heading for harassment are stated as follows: (1) "Defendant 
harassed Plaintiff by taking unwelcome photos of the Plaintiff and his spouse and their home and cars." This claim is 
only brought against defendant Willard Lowe. (2) "Defendant engaged in actions to harass Plaintiff by making false 
accusations that Plaintiff broke the rule of the Mobile Home Park by not having a vehicle properly registered and 
licensed." This claim is only brought against Renee Hancock. 
15 
2. Malicious Mischief 
Malicious mischief, or criminal mischief, is codified in the Utah Criminal Code, under which a 
person commits criminal mischief if he "intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of 
another." Utah Code Ann. 76-6-106(2)(c). An important element of malicious mischief is 
intent-specifically, malice-and the plaintiff has not asserted any facts to show that the defendant acted 
intentionally, let alone that the defendants acted with a malicious intent, to cause damage to the 
plaintiffs property. If anything, the nature of the complained of actions seem like an accident.18 Yet 
even if the plaintiffs claim could be viewed as negligent destruction of property, the plaintiff has not 
alleged that the defendants owed him a duty which they later breached. 
Malicious mischief, is above all else, destruction of property. The plaintiff makes several 
accusations under his malicious mischief claim; however, three of them do not constitute damage to 
property. First, the plaintiffs allegation that the defendant made false statements19 does not demonstrate 
any damage to property. Second, the plaintiffs accusations that the defendant spread moth balls in 
order to exacerbate the plaintiffs asthma are not destruction of property.20 Additionally, the plaintiff 
even fails to allege any facts about where the moth balls were spread and without such facts it is nearly 
15 The plaintiffs claim under cause of action heading malicious mischief alleges the following: (I) "Defendant is 
responsibile for damage to Plaintiffs vehicle (scratches on paint), by causing his friend's front yard gate to open 
and strike Plaintiffs vehicle while it was parked in Plaintiffs driveway." and (2) "Defendant caused damage to 
Plaintiffs property by watering a shed wall of the Plaintiffs while watering his friend's yard." These claims are 
brought against both defendants. 
16 As the plaintiff is again alleging that the defendants made some sort of false statement, such a claim should also 
be pled with particularity according to the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
18 The plaintiffs claim under a cause of action heading for malicious mischief is stated as follows: "Defendant 
spread moth (2) ball crystals to exacerbate Plaintiffs asthma." This claim is only brought against defendant Renee 
Hancock. 
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impossible to contemplate any cause of action under which the plaintiff could sue. Finally, the 
defendant's alleged attack on the plaintiff is also not destruction of property. 
Assault is intentionally causing another person reasonable, imminent apprehension of harmful or 
offensive contact. Restatement (Second) of Torts, 21. Battery is intentionally causing harmful or 
offensive contact to another. Restatement (Second) of Torts, 13. Here, the plaintiff only alleges the 
legal conclusion that the defendants assaulted him without providing any facts to support that 
conclusion.21 
In conclusion, because the plaintiff has only alleged legal conclusions without providing any facts 
to support those conclusions, because the plaintiff has not given any facts to illustrate the nature and 
substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendants, and because the plaintiff has not provided 
enough facts to identify a cognizable cause of action under which he has a legitimate claim, the plaintiffs 
claim should be dismissed. 
20 The plaintiffs claim brought under a cause of action heading for malicious mischief is stated as follows: 
"Defendant, without provocation, attacked and physically assaulted plaintiff while Plaintiff was standing at the end 
of his driveway, a very short while later, Defendant's friend joined in the assault of the Plaintiff." This claim is only 
brought against the defendant, Willard Lowe. 
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CONCLUSION 
In general, the plaintiffs entire complaint is a broad, conclusory accusation that is not supported 
by any facts to illustrate the nature and substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendants. The 
plaintiffs claims of obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting a false claim, and conspiracy are 
allegations of fraud or deception which must be pled with particularity. Under each of those claims, the 
plaintiff fails to provide any facts to show the contents, nature, or substance of the alleged false 
statements and, therefore, does not give the defendants notice of the nature, basis, and grounds of the 
claim. The remaining claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, and malicious 
mischief are either legal conclusions which are not supported by any facts or are broad, conclusory 
accusations which are not supported by facts sufficient enough to determine whether a cognizable cause 
of action exists or whether the plaintiff has a legitimate claim under an identifiable cause of action. 
For these reasons and the reasons set forth above, this court should dismiss each of the 
Plaintiffs claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
DATED this 7th day of July 2007. 
Branden B. Miles 
Attorney for Defendant Renee Hancock 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed on the 7th day of July 2007, a copy of the foregoing MOTION 
TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM to: 
Jason B. Cody 
P.O. Box 9732 
Ogden,UT 84409-1182 
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Addendum 
C 
T<x£OY\-Cod/ fVoS*. 
ft>-Bo* T13X 
PKow.e Sot 617-1182. 
WeUr Couvcty, sm-te a? UXah 
plaints 
/ -
To Wfltton t> Aisms* 4bt 
civrl i^.o^o^o^o^ m.t 
Ptainted 3O5<?K. C*dk froS^, JV*fcwur2> Hus ft&n&cmJuyH. 
"& b e lo^t^Kt ot^WtVtep\eo^U>iy a>c d.of^l<W-tV.e-ph»f^ 
TtV>;^ t ? # l £ £e<x WVtttfk'aH t? pK&lr- "& YMftKiH^ QL-feviA.1 pl£4j(ihoj . 
9<L<L URCP ftrfe Vlfoi &>(&$)- tt&C-P fade llfc? OL-ddtessts 
^y>*1abte , V?ut cf too Wjuli ta\te fcn»*v K^UtV i +i b<? -£-/* I Pr\Mr 
to ^:ca fm o^vTuly <tf,%xrt Wkrdi WJ^ the cb££ <>-£ p!W\R<^, 
R&vv &e>/"flvex. OK^K«J> p o k i e r vitfh.ji&inot&k OJ veU, 
"tka-tTsc plea.dttv\^ t/ net^wotJoh -W^vrr* Vff&x, Ctmctron. tV >'»t 
a plea^nq- ^ r #ule 7^? (?)»rCl iW^nd<uvd£AHk*£AK 
^uVt , auJLtke rec i^-dl ChoU-cafes tKat ^ J t U<LI# W ^ hotOLpptitcL 
by l&ckihq ike he^atW t*W erf CCHWT, £ctt tta-f itaKbe pahf" 
C( R.CLP u^JL-e 8 4) r? WASU a-ftiodtehy ^ hy fa& motto*. t*d.c$YA.c?? 
<*fcX ife 5'tate ynent o-£ a&sdpf<L &<-ts ' &K(--BUV tmp<j>ta>tt K4e.t1Wr)us 
be upke td-&>>-.$ uA. ta*^ *fr*-KdU>u} Stauic/- bp KijpecW by o<k <*£&££»• 
&4 "the Cci^t«T£»<#tpu>p^y T^>i«aN^C*- lacxkehdthut'Cf('i imfoss&le-
-Sfc*- a*v o44 tC£ir &£ $ £ Cou.>t 1z> Meet V ' fublrc^vtty to t^e court ^Keh 
to pucfec£ o4- UW £0 blftfruify 4[y£ ?* tk<L-&c<? of OR£f gde U(b) 
(£) if) &?feJ * PeY-Xa-pi-iW couirircovdJ- e*couJr* 3? AiVfa i?ew<jir^  
•fecit* «i/- K^ te pub l ic i ty t* tke c JUft V»y^ «tti><^  ku Jt\-"*ftCoyi W/tk 
^Oact^xs, at tke. d^t-fi d^chcttovv» P^hapx k«-w)vof/;i<j| tW" 
•fit? e.0wrt wtfuldt w«& -ftiifti^ c4 @uf a>jl c w d i t i r w <^/,*wfh kfs. 
-fWoV, wXenlk^ Actii "ft*i*cWev^axt W >>fiRc^ u».it>/ W * already 
Wjuvej-tkg. Cisu* o^-fvt ty tta-CY^^ult by-&:U>M t i ^ f fexT £W 
fe.^WAirAki i , tk^C j>u>t ^>k'ull ^ ytevm ^ k h tk/Y f^ Wfemrfa: 
1a CJ iKf lyW' t t l t t e U.RCP l^i(£ 7 ; R*i€ tf, Ru{«? U , R a l ^ a , * ) i i P ^ f i . 
•Av ''4/ "f)i«^ ^ a i ^ / ; H t t vn<rt/>U"^  J-7/^r*. r -A>> 4*3\<M to $*hfc 
S ^ : / tkjuLAb*- lyddite ,( *>^/;lrrk^>»+Vr^"^^ V*f^> tr/c^.'^-
W>(&£ au pctdi '< T W i W t f 7?5t 4caXK #t le*-S>t>i&T hue.&cb 
butoct^ Vc&ue,Y the ;<xJn€ J M -^KCA£IO>IS dLhdt -feb^ ^cj '^ojfojfc? 
Uwf iKe lH;t**t Ativan W4i b t v ^ X t 1> adt<4w/\ 14' +ke dz&ydairf' 
nac* ynoiLOVi? Especially thr? f><tfttcdAt trtit&h uUdk by ctf feW 
fhe C a v t p U ^ <x^ o J W t e L &<L W.K6P &l«. l^k? a>(0 ^kzk'j&s.j 
vtdt fr-e/£vite^ £ r t W ^ y r n ^ t ^ / t ^ i y <xy?;vj£ry JV- >q?ly, exc&f{ 
(S) tVott iWi-^fe^e o4 {atljiirc to /taiTt <*-<-Uc>nupoAwlwJi re.ktf€ 
Cft»v W - OJrariUiJl, iKe. ig&nv € o t -$*i (.aire t* W>i <xk ~iYi<U5f>*n±*H£{ta*tyj 
a>v(-tKe zh~\e<StlbY\ e£-Qiz\\jar*. to jtat* c^l^tlM&ty^c t° &- chum, tn<*y 
^U& be ttifdu- by^~ Utttv HeaJinoj , i-£ on? u ptLfmr-tfpjC, oY Vy 
1® ShvmuJ -&V felur^ t« >t«Jt<» a < \.< avi - "~ B vp> AJK*» 1 , A Yn of&»> i "fe 
c\l>>wt>*i t/hJfi> SuWLVivijn^b') O aJmtts tkf-#ufo odloJyd
 tH fK^ 5 
-^ xc1i/.K> t i ^xN a_ l^oCn>/ tig C:^tmwtc*yiS!tu* f)'f (^^aU't h< t)\« 
0. ^oL-Paz-tihtkc? ecu* 7; tXaMW d*-&*l**t did tf at •#•'<? J<x 
^'-KtatHi A- cJr^r>_,M,a-rm ', - t U v j putr1"/ ^CYKpU-Vt, ?-£ ^p«-rjj^ '^Wo 
k-'xi Ytof Avr o K ^ t l pjJr+y r, >it)»>?i«x^ {/>i«/felr fie p-oi/tV^M ^ tfuLelH) 
>+)u Ir p W ^ ^ shxV b** alloVjt'.i
 y'-v ^ ?t +V><f" "i>?^  Couhfwaj, -^^I r 
a V-pV to ai ^ ' . w e r a r 4 ^ 0 4 . party «*>u3<>r. (J1;,^ £*«? UPC??<>e 12^ 
•J>iy plv<xl"J<5 / VO V * " ^ > Ok. > (^ftt , LOt'ifcrxVyv,, ' t ^ . , J . a ' n ^ C h 4 ! ?\J pry}?, C'^W/ 
rvWeWy »r>©T'on: <]/ Ud< ol JuKdlxtoh <H^ttli£;?uJo]extw*lt£t/ 
'£) UJ^^Ed^fdi0- '* oi/fef ti.e peHj)?, 3) ;y>ipft>p^  vVvuu2, 
^r\itxn o\JlCvptnx^Ie pa>ty, & rWjtibK W^>4 c ^ ^*fii^ j ^ n ^ 
SM be mode, b^-fo^ pt^cVio f-^ cvlxK^V- p^juii^ t: p^ w«."f t>rX «-
c4 ! ^ ^ l ^ a^jL t l ^ S\.J» Vt? l^ruo\, —F.u'Uv* t i State a cl^m ttf.-n 
(AMUSS i+opp*wr? T* on ^vWvitjf "thocttke ptwXw±c-££ WouLibe£nt?tiedt 
To Mo ^Ut-f und«v"Any >+aL"fcfi.o4^ u.t> w)uek c Jtdi fc>«L prcvejUw Support 
(^tVf«ck;m . i u p m Gvt>)) Umm'ri K Ath-o (It O.taK-^57, 2*3 ft*^ 
tH) (w$£); cWfcnStvi VC Lei:? Aul:-»m.afeTha»j m^iffh Jennie l*c~? 
f^e p>o pWfet* c£ OL cL~s tries fiLuhJUjrrKtJ N e 15 a. matter ^ fou&J, 
h8.y;<auaWe^Cort^<±«e5S, States VC V;<m Wagoner-, J?.n U±JLII <*.*, 
W P.5J- 662. a u 4 Utfcp Rule. 5 5 ^ / s-bctes, (a) Exty. Mken 
OL party a^ajx^T NAjkffm. 0LltM:l<je.me»it W as£&>ma.ttVe Mc*^ is 
Sou^Vit KOLS fclej to pUciJ. eV ot^^v)tS^dk|€Vl<iai , pr*v:dU?i fcy t W e 
ITIJLUJ, otfujt ttaf-ftud: i S tncu/A to appear tke d<?lrK > Jjatf e/iteh "ft t i e&ui t 
(L TuJ^mevt by dfi&.v^ S KoJLL not be <k|^N>Ct CVL Kchd -&ro>ri, or-exdet?at 
W W cArdbit *ttie ddkncUKt ayt_$ w£ h ? 5lt&. ce t^aTn ly W ^ *x ^ W . 
t i m e aW- Jo d u i h^r- a£foni«Y, WK BravicW B- Mfte*, wfc© Ti^t* 
happen e l To W th*> ctaputy cocoty attorney t W t W l pircSecut^dLhw 
jdrtKa c.ftm>ft4 trfftA voke^ vkJ^e TaVm /yton-cJ CaHUcc/W me J^ 
CU7J heir£h'£h<i and ph)kiUy a. /ah<}€ JLo;^  ^Sympathy -Prom the 
c-f tW<W6? tv<o fw Y)v/£jLVcYt bull npUTie t U t -fli^'« tk>^V hc^^^n-1 
Wt V>oaV ai< t^e. t«"w w abcutcL p t r son that haS fcten. ^Klui te t i o4 
>-r'-'»'fS a^c^ ^>ito»t*-p-^J t j fruovi -(<h St-VvKiLyeaH but ttah t ^ y 
'V»> ^v j>ieir«.t-J by DNA -^'<^irv - Jh pvirlity; + b ^ l : j t Vf^J^wt ^ 
co\d UaJLy poUi£ "to tkt K Y * ^ S 3-t tKc O-'W^e, wKtle £i>» ye^M" 
Kaw -&VVHL o^K^v- p5oy* ^ b ^ JL ^UK Ws bfe>i sVH/fn* t<*m£ 
I )- ^t^t-pp^e I WJI r-v-r i'i)A«rv;t^iil ^ t K"W 4 fixity->>~behua/r©N 
C^Kt r^m W a >tr»t(rKU' ]fVl<ew Snfcc^  K^ xbJLvilh ttVteJ ma* still. 
PutfCh^ -€L»Wtk. <^  ^ irvA.t t^4«-irt to W'* "me t>auv$ feH-tJ- #r-jm- Tou.t 
To ? K ; 0 V ^ Ct WJL; tWt mo im^ t i ^ t X UaMttJl ttat-tta? J*&-KW~ 
<vv\i-£Ke*d tai cWtCA^Y been en Csntivt" Wrtk od~i-oWity Wr/^ <x> \\e 
KhoW "tksdt W UJGLJ T^WS^YLTCV^ "ttu?M Tvw\* QCVtt <^&s lUntr' £ Ju\J ccVfcKd 
p u i * \ < d , I u^j>T CG b I JLn't mai<«L A»\y itau £ OLT O£ I t * fte Ir^ . U1 ai" 
+ki** pro^ecuktoV fKat l ttau^Vtf W ^ _ a b s o U t ^ H'4%,1 for m*,nc\iJ 
tepTrfc-?€Yi"t<>9 "^-£^e i£-%<^d^t5 ou fny cppontht iVitW_>e> CA±*>S <W_ 
he h-dlnlt -td^J -m cms weir ? wkxt u/-t> L^CCH^ O>?* *«lrtjii>ly <XK 
c\+toTrtv.ey ^ ^Vatp ofc mCv»J -o fl?r VT1 Us "-uijl n J t h ^ t -£bir^tteyv cy-
> Jj*YS*i. fvAYty , a p«Yj,oV\ lA.Vorvi h<» VA.,U1JI 1' KV "^ >-^ ^ J t ^ J vv'OJ Hi£ 
T ^ >rirt:9yL"Wcci ^pfcalo (Mids-ay*, ye>y I aJ»>:+" al1 ),ijthau^ ^<Cfe>yt5 
«.v)r«- tisie
 ; ktdri joif" +li"^ V«JLC >X JU.U ^ t fKi />?'«.k rv:he.y ^ T^tK 
rf ;^u t ^ w^, a, i L uy J w s KM J. v^a± I^JJ I w f ^ v ^ i . 2>2-tyWt M» 
/")> •V"'«J-^b^uitiie^ctC'thtjLliv1>^^1V-'At UT; f \uj cWr>xiiy 5xt 
+ha-t HCULO^ VKL $6 v\)h>ij vjKtfn "H^t <LKnunul/+K^ bully, ko^o&tauifecl 
to Wajt (jiowKiV^ t e m W Man wta »^<jL aiirtostrbciteK y«uh-fe;i e^t-<lb*Ks£-£ 
(Aj^ Jlnavo bujs t^s heW€/'Hivi c^dx* rty to S u e ^ u f a t o W u t ^ a t r w e 
tWv^£ st<Mrted to UYiYav-el y^ci ^t4^htnec>CiJ>i^e»\ct k j j . CJj^kt'/p KV1K 
tkvna, ( J c ^ M ) or tjicy ^cr* Sc wired ! W lraybe KeowU pr»WV- O^tev-
a l l hedi^e^yruto K<VJ^  tWTtap<- l¥<-hkr htcnly >*inrtf uWe. ui?;( fyttxfe 
fce KacL Jxsme. Kj^ jL c4 tvuky^e , m<*, be ke c u^< J p*o ve 11 i $© tWe "two 
CsvispiftcbN cj»n^3«JLto ioV?ui" tke t^ W &-*e t , -£rxwt* kvn and ^t~h^»t 
KrJ<e'i o<«£ o4: "tKe t n c /*> po^K&lr Oped - WW Oft V X ^ c ^ t * J<? nW? 
ye5y ttW&J <|_udta CuVnjjodir^ vrv oJLM^ Wt, ^ W K Wthfe. c^0i\^ "t« bg. 
bacc^y Wiov Tm wpmcj cuto4iKe WJKJ oh iK^ ev*v ^ (L^tef all Kt kad 
V» i s OxHrfilr & 1W*£ s£
 ; W i\i(ti up aW cowo^, kou vtouic* < t kaK t-£ fecplt: 
^ijLKloit tka the iuvj. put~oK amouivt PJftJa t n ^ l , Nearly m Pr-C*cvi -
IlG, tka t \u>t"uJuuU >it do ; cJLrnJL/xU' ik> J»<rit UJakt t^ <y> to TCM.'!, dj./t/ui 
H-D, vo<i Iriai/e to Irricckt; hu*^i/it^o a » v . Mobo.(.y he^db \ Know- t'LL 
rtprv ^ h t /G<A to t>v a ^ ^ ' ^ YJU- ^ w £ moht>y ^ tKah ^ll.ICuKd.0. 
cvj^ i- fhuitj U-W tW
 t Sc\ £ U tK.'j parti\_u*Jh VY'st^ K, yt'xK^£Wc<&y )*.)u .^. 
C ^( to,' I +KJAW M>ti"f! Wr w;k? at^rr^^vH-p J^tKi.^t, 
Ra'tl ,'HK) t^ , f^j-rt ,^;^> OK«ui-,t *Ki abHoJ-.vt-K , F\^ _;+V 'liK-V^ 
\W Mot^K4^ d W o 5 4 )V- *%.)uir*. to ctil€. a J*;m.3 «c<dUi\Ly t«nmtf 
XYM"frcK "(^ u^mr,iDicx>y Yud^ finest W / ^ ^ .n{t\»:ij to ^ K ^ o t il( +Ke 
tv d^ue W_e^ f4.uj>tth xn.j, i^sttf:"xi[ g t i JL^LOHJ c r a ^ t t t th^gj , 
i/v f^.^cj^d nte CuK t L'Cft? that Jt^" F t *>*-* t^'vnJ ^"ify kyT-uL^iOoth^ 
tv -^wJL :> ttaxauJolt {JLHAIOT; ft at kcj t-vtJ<c)'^ t. is ^^fhv-^.wj r\> i^a«..upi^  
^vi^j^y p/att. * Goat) IAJO^ K
 ;-to\-aK UPttn^al J ' i h n^>"^  >^OUHJ^V( 
lOitk Ma Sevn«? o l cWctKy Cihoh^ p m < ^ a l bahor- OLhJ. \Afl\u 'jbvYuU*ty 
C J U ' J ndtCixY*. U ^ about lUs rlufy <W KSpanS'bft'Jjf '*> i* o-t^tlr o{ 
l i e O ^ ^ ^ ^ Cannon of: ttlru $
 ) r^-tVi^  crmW^ worar-/y o-£ £#.>3 
?K* Bi-^xlt ?i* bcS j^aLw^S' v*Ji4»"H\^ Otiht/ ft^h JU»y a l ^ k c * to TuJtCct 
O^ui C^ iXh p ' Y CkKd "Htfc-OmufeViOiK Uioy> 
C^c*^K£J-akaut" tk*p0JSiUfc I f a b o j r ^ to Ws cic^wTs , Ui«D tftft fru^h „ 
t)ssvtf 1 •et VUYYV cyctaujay UJ fHi ft, he> /y«>i$ ai1ul ^ **f"in<$ awct 
l>uK~n^ ajnno^Kbfry o £ U R C P P u t l\ b") VOkr^  ^Tute>,ib) &pK$*vta t" w 
t o H ^ G u h L By ph?J.(rntt\^ OLpieaJLtA^; WKt ten Wat"1:*, Ohctiaeh pd^eh 
•fbt^f 'Cjuft CwKiitii€.v LH .Si<}\nit^  ,^, 'L'^J\/ Subn* -it>$ oHodtir- julyc-cil^).. 
aKcxttolrn^y or u^ph-^Ktv . j party t!> CtrtH'yut^ t k a t t j tine b ^ t 
pW^vt*• 1 &h amy Tnjph pth pmps<?, St« J* a; t> b *>&>.* chto ca^ ft" 
ar n ^  c « s OL^  d*Aay o h n'e.edLlftps IVLCLK^^ cvuiK.«. c^ito^ (c& «^t&K * ^»\ ^ ) 
IVTC c tons
 r dsL^tmS^, cQ7i.otW le^al Cflhtej»tioh.y tteKn OK W^Hnfecl 
ky -exTstfn^ [aK;<yvl&y lroK^Kv«bus OLh^ fiJfne>t IcrvtV^ ^ t o t r t e ^ , 
yttfldz&cofovi; o^l(^e^5^U€ey:Jt t^^v;o^1leesfebl j :^km^t *^ 
Kie-w law t W a k e fiul^ll W^s1bdk<^W->j(afcM.^^cfcy 
Tw-fos^- TWs hxle empKoirzer avLfcH&wi^ fc put I re duty <X$OK 
c-4 t^oa> o£ tke. Court, as appoint© ttaafforfe^ pKi/ate duty T5 
N^tesed: orients W&iVeit Z-eaWiy * £ ^ ^ / , 6o<*k ,UU^ 
Only \nitax ft ^t^tS (L? cLmottev o% la» i^aJbtk*- pkofc££ ^Ky^t" t&wm} 
Hamy V". SWtm , 5SH fcad. <la£ feiah. w s ) + 
Ptate^£-^cW1b Sta&a.claim tfohwVck re-tai Cot»i4- be ^lrakfe^ 
QYice, MafeK 0ut?&eik^pte^cH<^ vOehcpi^ feHted-to ojvkK&texcluded 
likL V^  Ivnck, W5 P d^L \^<o (u*i*)i I W ) 4 
— Court? cUicKttoyL* !•€ *. WattoKto <Auw#f tUuteh fofedcirtWt 
Q a ) ^ 15 p h e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t o K t ^ a o K C t d ^ m e ^ t t f e h S out*/U«-"&€ 
pi£autiha; &u"fralfy to Thikfi. Diroetto-L *£ tta. tK&Uou/t «- ^+TaW 
/* Or;ot£4aJL JWfiritr o4 una/. o£ Itfok 561 £a.JL 1<U (Utak Wr*) «• 
PlaintiW onto tW court to fKVtnt a. ShiuyL by ^JTCMCKJ 
0L"5 Hie ffhty h&oo^ vv its t hen . t$ to be_1tatK<^«^-&>vWK Meter 
&ajui. tipoK ttee. Couyt * 
COYiCta.5toyi 
How S^d, to wMc-WatiVn K«t5 fc>eexa_Sta*\- ^ mAfi-V^ ftstfL 
Hflflu^ rc frk-tceYi trCcK lout iwW: he c? htalv obrn^ F? "ftan^nq 
k? j he s ^  at tK^ _Hd£J *4 tKe £outf i^ od: <y i^e. <W- yvon ot^ S y?W«-£ 3artc< 
DOKI ailcw Kiwvtb popefrote- tktf -ftuu/1, Ko^ ol Konta tKetNie. m<L<tfuTh^  *4 
te hiottc?n Ufkcdt AflLtyiCtfa by to own -frto^ o% \\ tWt" ke 
OnKnoto l&jqzs ike fnik ol Ui«. claims nuxdji iKijkA. cchipkuttv Hie. 
cU^evL^Wt inruJU-tk^ CdLhv a^c^ wwU e^vn^Kt: wvkeK,^ kfi.cKoM not 
t© -£d*L O.K dk?wet-* DftKt let tketn. pulltkis c£ut6k£ WtcKirbW-
^XcMoe, tkei>-&*cts wktckis n«iKcn^  vY^beiW^trc^K^tcyrt^W^JDt 
Thex dexy ike tttottayx-fchike £eveb*i t ^ i W f i Ihsax&w? t U t you. 
hoa/eto cUhy it^CtK v Let? upho&IHiL Dtyncty elovor iM t^Cc -^
FbvtKe5e.NoL.5onS <W4k herons, -fads, Ah^Lat;e W S-Utedl 
<*.We-; a>idlte> p K i t m ike. K^ktoame;$, koKext^ ayicl-fflu>k£r/ 
o^ouh Utak&u>t8ui£-?; cu\d hesp^ct £ohik£VitW<UM^bty^ of 
OtxV "Juitioe, 2y*febL ctvuiL ouy- CouJrtf, I cxs K yoU.1b oU w^«t ycm. Kto W 
To b^vft&jkt, exdu^^^cF4iit^f^mj/c3UhCo)^rd^A-tr©Yi #4 tke 
y<$u> cU*<yr*U©Yv oairL d<eh£ tkC^ bluta!^ ttHSttoh'tib Ai?*r<L9? -foh 
-£<xduJH>_to State, oudaivn. an 0uice>bOnt O4 ifr -StftaJr t^a Osmply wrik 
Tkjg_ atecVL R u t o o % CLva. fHc&rbLHL_ 
Pate^ t fe r ^ c U y *€ July, *OG7 
3OLSOKCO^ ftftS*. 
2_3 SO Wou^-fen & < ; $iu'+e £30, C^oi, afeA. 2W* 
JU^&u %iy 
ZciS&yi &<ty fV& Se. 
